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Abstract 
Anxiety is an adaptive response that promotes harm avoidance; but at the same time excessive anxiety 
constitutes the most common psychiatric complaint. Moreover, current treatments for anxiety – both 
psychological and pharmacological - hover at around 50% recovery rates. Improving treatment 
outcomes is nevertheless difficult, in part because contemporary interventions were developed without 
an understanding of the underlying neurobiological mechanisms that they modulate. Recent advances in 
experimental models of anxiety in humans, such as threat of unpredictable shock, have, however, 
enabled us to start translating the wealth of mechanistic animal work on defensive behavior into 
humans. In this paper we discuss the distinction between fear and anxiety, before reviewing 
translational research on the neural circuitry of anxiety in animal models and how it relates to human 
neuroimaging studies across both healthy and clinical populations. We highlight the roles of subcortical 
regions (and their subunits) such as the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, the amgydala, and the 
hippocampus, as well as their connectivity to cortical regions such as dorsal medial and lateral 
prefrontal/cingulate cortex and insula in maintaining anxiety responding. We discuss how this circuitry 
 2 
 
might be modulated by current treatments before finally highlighting areas for future research that 
might ultimately improve treatment outcomes for this common and debilitating transdiagnostic 
symptom. 
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1Introduction 
Fear and anxiety are adaptive, defensive reactions to threat across species. However, excessive 
fear or anxiety can interfere with quality of life. Indeed, anxiety disorders are the most prevalent 
psychiatric disorders and excessive anxiety is implicated in most psychiatric disorders, as well as a 
number of other medical and neurological conditions. Anxiety is thus accompanied by a high financial 
cost1. Compounding this, response rates to first-line pharmacological and psychological treatments are 
less than 50%2: most patients fail to respond to the first treatment that targets their anxiety. Other 
review papers focus on the neural circuitry of fear3–5; this review focuses on our understanding of the 
underlying neurobiology of anxiety, as a construct not only more closely related to anxiety disorders 
such as generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), but also highly relevant transdiagnostically to other 
psychiatric and neurological disorders. In this review, which is intended as a broad narrative 
introduction for those new to the field, we argue that understanding this neurobiology, as well as the 
features that differentiate adaptive from pathological anxiety, is key to identifying pathological 
mechanisms and treatment targets. 
Fear and anxiety 
Whilst fear and anxiety share many subjective and physiological symptoms, they can be 
differentiated based on behavioral profiles determined by certainty6,7, which can be further subdivided 
into the contingency, temporal precision, and spatial precision of the threat:  
 In fear, the danger is imminent, unambiguous and mobilizes the organism to take 
immediate action. Fear is above all a rapid behavioral response that leads to active 
avoidance (e.g., fight-or-flight), or other automatic responses such as freezing in prey 
animals or piloerection (goosebumps). Pathological fear is seen in specific phobias, 
which are characterized by a marked fear of specific objects.  
 In anxiety, the threat is more diffuse and uncertain. Anxiety is a lasting state of 
apprehension of potential future threats accompanied by negative affect, autonomic 
symptoms, worry, increased vigilance, and passive avoidance8. Excessive anxiety 
symptoms can be found in GAD and panic disorder (though panic attacks themselves 
may be better characterized by models of acute fear, panic disorder, including 
apprehension of subsequent attacks, is considered to be better modelled by anxiety)8.  
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There is a body of research indicating that fear and anxiety are tractable and are associated with 
distinct pathologies6,7,9. Early research into fear and anxiety found that there was a double dissociation 
between neural structures relating to threats that were phasic (fear) and sustained (anxiety)6, which led 
to a theoretical model in which anxiety and fear are putatively separate processes. Although the true 
neurobiological picture is likely to be more nuanced than this10,11, this distinction is also reflected in the 
RDoC matrix, which distinguishes between acute threat (fear) and potential threat (anxiety)12,13 as well 
as in the DSM-5 where specific phobias are defined as "cued by the presence or anticipation of specific 
objects or situations”, while generalized anxiety disorder, by contrast, is defined as “Excessive anxiety 
and worry (apprehensive expectation) … about a number of events or activities”14.  
The widest array of research to date involves Pavlovian cued fear conditioning in rodents15. 
Unfortunately, while fear conditioning is a useful model of fear, it is insensitive to drugs that are 
anxiolytic in humans16–19 and is thus a poor model of anxiety disorders such as GAD20,21. Comparatively 
little is known about anxiety, especially its many human-specific cognitive-affective features. Indeed, 
many animal models of anxiety, such as the elevated-plus maze, have few analogs in humans22 (although 
see Biederman et al. (2017)23 and Bach et al. (2014)24) , and of course the impact of psychological 
therapies cannot be studied in animals. However, innovative approaches to study anxiety 
experimentally in humans have recently been developed. This paper reviews this emerging literature 
and suggests a model of its neural underpinnings.  
The phenomenology of pathological anxiety 
Following Freud who distinguished chronic anxiety from anxiety (panic) attack, clinicians have 
long recognized that anxiety is not a unitary phenomenon8. This non-unitary view of anxiety is reflected 
in the DSM-5, which identifies several anxiety disorders characterized by shared “features of excessive 
fear and anxiety”, including panic disorder (PD), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), social anxiety 
disorder (SAD), and simple phobia (SP). Other disorders within the DSM also have anxiety as a core 
symptom, such as obsessive-compulsive disorders and addiction disorders. Additionally, a number of 
neurological disorders feature elevated anxiety, including variants of dementia such as frontotemporal 
dementia, vascular dementia, and Alzheimer’s disease25, along with Parkinson’s disease26 and traumatic 
brain injury27,28.  
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However, despite symptom heterogeneity, we do not at present have clear objective markers 
that can differentiate between disorders which feature anxiety, and there is, moreover, strong symptom 
overlap. All share common enduring behavioral, cognitive, and physiological characteristics, potentially 
arising from impairments in transdiagnostic features, as seen in the RDoC12 domain of negative valence 
systems13 which highlights exaggerated or problematic responses to ‘potential threat (anxiety)’. In this 
paper, based on the assumption that similar phenomenological presentations of ‘anxiety’ reflect true 
underlying neurobiological similarities, we discuss the shared neural circuitry which may underlie 
sustained anxiety symptoms. 
Translational neuroscience of anxiety 
Early work in fear conditioning in animal models highlighted a key role of two amygdala nuclei, 
the basolateral amygdala (BLA) and the central nucleus of the amygdala (CeA) in anxiety. The BLA 
integrates sensory information from the environment and, via its projections, excites the CeA. The 
amygdala subsequently triggers defensive responses, via efferent projections to regions such as the stria 
terminalis, the hippocampus, the ventral striatum, the orbitofrontal cortex, the periaqueductal grey, and 
the hypothalamus29. While the amygdala is important for fear conditioning, its direct role in maintaining 
sustained anxiety symptoms has been more difficult to establish. Lesions of the amygdala do not reduce 
defensive responses in models of anxiety such as the elevated plus-maze30 and the anxiolytic 
benzodiazepine does not act via the amygdala31.  
This contrasts with another structure tightly coupled with the CeA, the bed nucleus of the stria 
terminalis (BNST), which does appear to be preferentially involved in maintaining sustained anxiety6,7,32. 
The BNST is a part of the “extended amygdala”33, which is well-situated to regulate defensive responses 
such as anxiety via its GABA (gamma-aminobutyric acid)-ergic projections to various limbic, hindbrain 
and cortical structures6,7,32 . 
Consideration of the conditions that determine the involvement of the BNST in defensive 
responses emphasizes the role of temporal unpredictability of the threats34 and the sustained duration 
of the response7,35. Early evidence of a differentiation between fear and anxiety in the BNST came from 
studies using the startle reflex. ‘Fear-potentiated startle’ refers to the increased startle reflex amplitude 
in the presence of a short-duration threat, while ‘anxiety-potentiated startle’ to the increased startle 
amplitude during a long-duration unpredictable threat. A series of studies by Davis and collaborators 
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established a double dissociation between the CeA and BNST; lesions of the CeA abolish fear-, but not 
anxiety-potentiated startle, while lesions of the BNST suppress anxiety-, but not fear-potentiated 
startle6,7. According to Davis’ group, anxiety is thus maintained by activation of corticotrophin receptors 
in the BNST7. 
More recent studies have, however, provided evidence that there is more nuance to the role of 
the BNST in anxiety. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the BNST is small but heterogeneous, with 
up to eighteen functionally distinct sub-regions36. Some BNST lesions can up-regulate anxiety37, while 
optogenetic stimulation of discrete BNST sub-regions can down-regulate anxiety38,39. Different efferent 
connections of the BNST also control different features of anxiety38,39, suggesting that distinct BNST sub-
regions dynamically control different aspects of defensive behavior38–44 (see Table 1). Of note, the story 
is almost certainly the same with regards to the role of the amygdala in fear, which is gradually being 
broken down into component micro-circuits45,46.  
Table 1: Studies informing our emerging understanding of the functions of the subregions of the BNST. Note that the majority of 
work has been done in rodents, due to the lack of spatial resolution of MRI prior to the advent of 7T MRI scanning.  
Region of BNST Function Species 
Right anterior Activated during threat>safe 
contrast in healthy control 
participants40 
Human 
Anteroventral Paraventricular nucleus 
excitation, promotes 
corticosterone secretion41 
Rat 
 
Posterior Inhibits stress-induced 
paraventricular nucleus 
excitation, adrenocorticotropic 
hormone release, and plasma 
corticosterone responses41 
Rat 
Anterolateral (encompassing 
oval nucleus) 
Attenuates stress-induced 
reductions in weight gain at end 
of 7 day stress period: 
mediating consequences of 
repeated stress?42 
Rat 
Anterodorsal BNST Social behaviour: namely 
defensive and reproductive 
behaviour43; promotes 
anxiolytic behavioour e.g. 
dereased risk-avoidance, 
decreased respiratory rate, 
positive conditioning valence38 
Rat 
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Oval nucleus of the BNST Anxiogenic (perhaps by 
inhibiting anterodorsal BNST)38 
Rat 
Ventral BNST Innervates VTA, stimulating 
glutamatergic projections 
results in aversive/anxiogenic 
phenotypes, stimulating 
GABAergic perojections results 
in rewarding/anxiolytic 
phenotypes by inhibition of VTA 
GABAergic neurons39; 
noradrenergic neurons may 
control freezing behaviour44 
Rat 
 
Moving into the cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is implicated in attention and 
affective information processing47 and hence also involved in responses to threat. The rodent mPFC is 
comprised of several sub-regions including the infralimbic (IL) and prelimbic cortex (PL), which are 
densely interconnected with the amygdala48 and play opposing roles in defensive behaviors49, with the IL 
inhibiting the amygdala (and defensive behaviors) and the PL exciting the amygdala. Empirical evidence 
of a role for the PL in sustained anxiety has been established using a wide range of paradigms including 
the elevated plus maze and the open field test50, context conditioning51, and fear conditioning with long-
duration conditioned stimuli (CS)52. Electrophysiological recordings in rodents show that PL neurons 
maintain persistent firing that correlate with freezing throughout the duration of sustained threat51,52 
and that PL firing persists during trace fear conditioning53, a paradigm during which the US is delivered 
after an empty interval following the end of the CS. These results suggest PL involvement in both 
defensive behaviors and the neural representation of threat (i.e., the unconditioned stimulus or US).  
The hippocampus also conveys contextual information about environmental threat54 to the PL55. 
Specifically, brain structures communicate via synchronized activity both in local networks56 and over 
longer distances57. This can be observed in theta oscillations, which have been linked to anxiety in 
rodents and humans58 and display synchronized activity between the ventral hippocampus and PL in 
anxiogenic contexts54. Additionally, research using operant conflict tasks has suggested that the 
hippocampus has a key role in decision-making in situations where there is a conflict between 
approaching rewards and avoiding punishments, a scenario which induces anxiety across-species59.  
Interoceptive information from visceral changes may also be conveyed, via the anterior insula, 
to the PL60. Specifically, robust visceral changes (heart rate, gastrointestinal, blood pressure) caused by 
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anxiety may generate a feedback loop between the PL and anterior insula that contributes to the 
maintenance of anxiety. Threat representation in the PL could then influence anxiety responses via 
directs1 or indirect input to the BNST through the basolateral amygdala60.  
Finally, PFC regions are also involved in anxiety via their role in working memory (WM). In 
rodents, WM deficits are associated with increased anxietys2. Primates have larger prefrontal cortices 
with additional medial and lateral dissociations. In monkeys, as in humans, WM relies in part on the 
dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC)s3, a structure that is also implicated in anxiety and stress. Maternal separation 
stress in young monkeys activates the right dlPFc, but deactivates the left dlPFCs4. In young monkeys, as 
in children, heightened reaction to novelty and potential threat characterizes an anxious temperament 
disposition, which is a well-established risk for the development of anxietys5. Critically, such anxious 
disposition in monkeys is associated with dlPFC malfunctions6.  
A possible neural model of anxiety that emerges from these studies in animals is that 
environmental signals from the ventral hippocampus and interoceptive signals from the anterior insula 
help maintain threat representation in the PL, which is then used to guide defensive behaviors via the 
BNST and the amygdala, and may be under the control of the dlPFC (see Figure 1).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The neuroscience of human anxiety and its pathology 
In recent years innovative translational experimental models that attempt to mimic and quantify 
sustained anxiety in humans have emerged. These include darknesss7, low concentration (7.5%) of CO2 
inhalations8, and vigilant threat monitorings9 (see Table 2). However, one widely used anxiety model in 
humans relies on long-duration threat of aversive stimuli such as shock (i.e., threat of shock or context 
conditionings10), where subjects are informed that shocks may be delivered unpredictably.  
Other paradigms investigating fear (e.g. ‘cued fear conditioning’s11) may seem at first sight to be 
investigating similar constructs. However, these paradigms are generally much more precise as to the 
temporal (and spatial) precision of the shock association (notably, further research is needed to 
ascertain the precise temporal/spatial conditions under which anxiety-related - rather than fear-related 
- circuitry is activated).  
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Table 2: Paradigms used for studying anxiety (as contrasted here for utility with fear). These paradigms often include aversive 
stimuli such as shocks, but may also be used with other aversive stimuli such as aversive noises/pictures or blasts of cold air. The 
commonality among all these paradigms is that they all evoke a sustained anxiety state. 
Paradigm Description 
Threat-of-shock Threat-of-shock paradigms instruct participants that they may be in one of two 
conditions: ‘safe from shock’ (during which no shocks are received) or ‘at risk of 
shock’ (during which shocks may be received). Shocks may occur during the ‘at 
risk’ blocks but with a low probability, and generally are scheduled 
independently of task performance. Other tasks may be performed with blocks 
of these contexts, to investigate the effects of this sustained threat on other 
cognitive processes. This is often measured using the eyeblink reflex, in a 
procedure known as ‘startle’. Greater anxiety is thought to correspond to the 
augmentation of the eyeblink reflex.  
Low dose (7.5%) 
CO2  
Inhaling air with > 7.5% CO2 concentration over a period of around 20 minutes 
increases both subjective experience of and physiological symptoms associated 
with anxiety  
Darkness As humans are a diurnal species, this task elicits anxiety and potentiates 
anxious responses (e.g. startle) by contrasting lighted conditions with complete 
darkness 
Vigilant threat 
monitoring 
Participants observe a line fluctuating on the screen which they are told reflects 
their own physiological levels of ‘anxiety’ (though in fact this line is generated 
by experimenters), and when this line passes a threshold they will receive a 
shock. They are instructed to remain calm and avoid accumulating shocks.  
Context 
conditioning 
During normal conditioning procedures, conditioning occurs either to the 
stimulus (cued conditioning) and/or to the context (context conditioning). The 
context here refers to features of the environment that are present during the 
conditioning procedure. Context conditioning is separate to the typical ‘cued 
conditioning’ used in fear learning paradigms due to the decreased temporal 
precision of the association between the context and the unconditioned 
stimulus.  
Long-duration CS This paradigm is similar to typical fear conditioning, in that a predictive stimulus 
(CS) is paired with an unconditioned aversive stimulus (US), except that the 
duration of presentation of the CS is longer, typically upwards of 30s. 
Approach-
avoidance conflict 
This type of paradigm, a translation of the animal paradigm of operant conflict, 
involves a choice or conflict between approaching rewards and avoiding 
punishments and has been argued to be anxiogenic.  
 
One key advantage of the startle probe methodology, discussed in the animal section above, is 
that it can also be employed in humans. Healthy human participants display heightened startle 
sensitivity during unpredictable threat relative to baseline, but, importantly, this startle sensitivity is 
further elevated in those with disorders that feature anxiety7,s12. Specifically, multiple studies have now 
shown exaggerated anxiety-potentiated (but not fear-potentiated) startle during unpredictable threat in 
panic disorders13–s16 and in PTSD s17–s19. GAD does not follow quite the same pattern – it is associated 
 10 
 
with increased startle overall during a threatening experimental environment. Exaggerated anxiety-
potentiated startle may therefore constitute a risk factor or early biomarker for developing disorders 
including heightened anxietys18,s19.  
Findings from unpredictable threat of shock studies in humans have implicated many of the 
same behavioral and neural responses that underpin (adaptive) anxiety in animals. In turn, these 
responses have also been implicated in pathological anxiety in humans. For instance, early functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies demonstrated amygdala involvement in processing both 
predictables20 and unpredictable threat9. Activity in the amygdala was also shown to be elevated in 
those with social phobia relative to controlss21,s22 and it was argued that this elevated response was 
critical for the development of the excessive anxiety.  
Subsequent work has, however, tempered these conclusions by demonstrating that the 
amygdala is sensitive to appetitive as well as aversive stimulis23. Moreover, consistent with animal data, 
many studies fail to report selective amygdala activation during sustained anxiety symptomss24,s25. It has 
therefore been argued that perhaps a key role of the amygdala is in goal-directed cognitive processing 
and/or behavior towards relevant/salient informations26. Given the clear asymmetries between 
appetitive and aversive stimuli value (i.e. the consequences are generally worse if one misses a threat 
than a reward), it may be that prior work associating the amygdala with anxiety reflects a more 
fundamental role of the amygdala that happens to be correlated with symptoms of anxiety (for example 
elevated harm avoidance in anxiety promoting the relevance/salience of threats) rather than any 
selective role in anxiety. 
Animal models also highlight the role of the prefrontal cortex in anxiety. In humans, elevated 
fMRI activity in dorsal regions of the PFC (dorsomedial PFC; dmPFC and dorsal anterior cingulate; dACC) 
has been associated with both unpredictable threat processing and pathological anxietys27. It has been 
argued, moreover, that it is specifically the rostral part of the dmPFC that drives conscious threat 
appraisal and worrys28. In healthy humans, dorsal ACC/dmPFC activation has been associated with a 
reduced ability to extinguish fear respondings29, and patients with PTSD show increased activation in the 
dACCs30. As with the amygdala, again, it should be noted that the dACC/dmPFC is responsible for a wide 
range of functions including goal directed behaviour, vestibular function, social responding and 
interoceptions31. Critically, it is hyperactive in most psychiatric disorderss32 and, as with the amygdala, 
this may be due to a more generic role in anticipating emotional stimulis33 and hence a key role in 
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appraising and expressing behavioural responses to the level of environmental threats34. In other words, 
hyperactivity in psychiatric disorders probably reflects this region’s more fundamental role - such 
directing cognitive processing and/or behaviour towards relevant/salient informations32 – that is 
important for harm avoidance. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given the links between both amygdala and dACC/dmPFC activity and 
anxiety-relevant symptoms, connectivity between these regions has also been implicated in the 
pathophysiology of anxiety. Specifically, functional imaging studies show that connectivity between the 
amygdala and the mPFC increases when healthy individuals are exposed to threat of unpredictable 
shock, and that the strength of this connectivity is greater in individuals with higher dispositional 
anxietys35–s37. This extends to the pathological state, such that in those with social anxiety or GAD, this 
same circuitry is elevated without overt anxiety inductions38. As such, the same circuitry that drives 
heightened attention towards threats under adaptive anxiety is also critical in pathological anxiety. To 
this end, it has been argued that this circuitry represents a human (functional) homologue of the rodent 
PL-amygdala/BNST circuit highlighted aboves30,s34–s37. If so, the key role that such circuitry plays in 
behavioral response to salient aversive information could underlie the harm avoidant negative bias 
towards threats in pathological anxiety. 
As also highlighted in the animal work above, the hippocampus is involved in anxiety, due, 
perhaps, to its key role in contextual learning/memorys39 and prospections40 or, alternatively, a role in 
avoidance24,s41,s42. Consistent with functional differentiation along the longitudinal axis of the rodent 
hippocampuss43, theta activity (2-8 Hz) from anterior hippocampus (or ventral in rodents) correlates with 
anxiety level in humans58; and at the same time theta from posterior hippocampus correlates with 
spatial memory performance in a simulated human version of the rodent Morris water maze tasks44. 
Notably, this theta-based coupling between hippocampus and mPFC scales-up with increased threat 
probabilitys45 and patients with PTSD exhibit aberrant activity and connectivity involving the 
hippocampus in the resting states46. This theta coupling evidence comes from magnetoencephalography 
(MEG): the evidence is more mixed in fMRI, with both hypo- and hyper-activation of the hippocampus 
reported in patientss47. Finally, threat of shock also modulates memory performance; improving 
contextual learning under threatening conditionss48,s49; which may be one mechanism by which the 
hippocampus maintains traumatic memories in disorders which feature elevated anxiety such as 
PTSDs50. Avoidance, on the other hand, can be studied using approach-avoidance conflict tasks (a variant 
on operant conflict tasks outlined above). Such tasks have been translated from non-human primate 
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works51,s52 into humans24,s41,s42,s53. This paradigm incorporates a range of tasks that set up a conflict 
between the inherent bias to avoid (learned or prepotent) negative outcomes and an approach 
response. This is thought to either be anxiogenic in itself24,s41,s42 , or, at the very least, to elicit avoidance 
responsess54 which are a core feature of anxiety disorders. Critically, such tasks implicate the 
hippocampus 24,s41,s42 and this conflict has been shown to be exacerbated, leading to increased 
avoidance, in humans during induced anxietys55, and in pathological anxietys56. 
The insula also plays a complex role in anxiety in humans. Together with the ACC and mPFC, the 
insula is a part of a network that detects, interprets, and reacts to internal bodily signalss57. Interoceptive 
signals are thought to be integrated in the insula following a posterior-mid-anterior pattern, with 
processing in the anterior insula producing conscious awareness of the informations58.The anterior 
insula has been suggested to make a key contribution to the anticipation and emotional experience of 
aversive stimuli, and, via the ACC, to the allocation of attention and initiation of appropriate actions57. 
Experimental psychopathology studies show that the anterior insula is broadly involved in anticipation 
of aversive events, but more specifically during anticipation of unpredictable compared to predictable 
threats59 and sustained versus transient anticipation9. Thus, the anterior insula is one of the structures 
that reliably maintains sustained activation during experimentally-induced anxiety9. It is also hyperactive 
in pathological anxiety, including panic disorders60 and GADs61, during sustained threat. In this instance, 
pathophysiology is not associated with chronic activation of the anterior insula but rather with 
heightened response during anxiety induction, possibly reflecting a feeling of lack of controls62 as well as 
autonomic and emotional distress during threats23. 
While animal studies have implicated the BNST in anxiety for some time now, it is only recently 
that progress in the spatial resolution of MRI has led to comprehensive exploration of this small 
structure in humanss63,s64. Older studies found activity in regions overlapping the BNST during induced 
anxiety - i.e. unpredictable threats9,s9,s24 - as distinct from amygdala activity during predictable threats 
(i.e. fear)9,s65. In addition, BNST activation during unpredictable shock correlates positively with the 
magnitude of autonomic arousals62. Consistent with findings from startle studies, heightened sensitivity 
to unpredictable threat in PTSD and panic disorders is associated with elevated sustained BNST 
activation, making this structure a promising biomarker of disease and treatment targetings60,s66. These 
studies also identified several structures that are coactivated with the BNST, including the dmPFC, 
ventrolateral; PFC, dorsolateral PFC, and anterior insula, attesting to the complexity of a putative 
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‘anxiety network’. These results suggest an important role for the BNST in mediating the hyperarousal 
and hypervigilance symptoms of pathological anxiety. 
Additionally, high resolution imaging using resting-state fMRI has revealed connectivity of the 
BNST in humans to many of the other regions discussed aboves64,s67. Critically, anxiety induced by threat 
of shock reveals reduced BNST connectivity with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and ACCs63. 
These are early findings, and research exploring clinical anxiety with high resolution imaging is still in its 
infancy, but given the highlighted role of the BNST in the animal literature, clinical research targeting the 
BNST, its microcircuits, and its functional connectivity offers great promise in the development of novel 
therapeutic interventions to treat pathological anxiety32.  
Finally, as in non-human primates, the dlPFC is involved in anxiety regulation and dispositional 
anxiety in humanss68, potentially because of a role in emotion regulation and attention control. In 
healthy subjects, the dlPFC is activated during anxiety induction procedures and the strength of this 
activation is negatively correlated with anxiety, indicating that poor dlPFC activation is associated with 
less anxiety down-regulation (although this is speculative)s69. Moreover, the dlPFC plays a role in explicit 
emotion regulation (for a review across all types or regulation strategies sees70). When subjects perform 
a cognitive task that engages the dlPFC (e.g. a working memory task – a ‘distraction’ form of emotional 
regulation), dlPFC activation concomitantly reduces anxiety induced by unpredictable shock, via top-
down control exerted on the dACC and ventrolateral PFCs71. The dlPFC is therefore a key structure for 
healthy functioning. When the dlPFC is activated to keep task goals in mind, dlPFC engagement also 
suppresses emotional interference and alleviates anxiety. It is now well-established that the dlPFC is 
hypo-activated in those with psychiatric disorders featuring anxiety during cognitive tasks, emotion 
regulation studies, and during anxiety induction proceduress32,s72.  
To summarize, research shows overlapping neural circuitry in response to anxiety between 
humans and animals. Specifically, connectivity between the hippocampus, BNST amygdala and medial 
prefrontal/cingulate cortex may contribute to a putative ‘anxiety network’ that may also be (down-) 
regulated by dorsolateral PFC. Notably, this network of regions bears some similarity to the ‘salience 
network’, which incorporates regions such as the dorsal anterior cingulate and insular regionss73. 
Nevertheless, many of the regions (especially the PFC) are not clear translational homologues across 
species and, perhaps more importantly, human work highlights that many of these patterns of activity 
are not unique to anxiety and may instead reflect more fundamental cognitive processes, such as 
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salience processing (in accordance with the key identity of many of those nodes within the salience 
network); which happen to constitute a key facet of anxiety. 
The role of treatment on anxiety circuitry 
Characterizing the behavioral effects of current treatments for pathological anxiety as well as 
their underlying neural mechanisms is crucial for the development of new treatments and the 
improvement of existing ones.  
Cornwell et al. (2017) recently reported MEG evidence that hypervigilant responding under 
threat of unpredictable shockss74 is reduced by the benzodiazepine alprazolams75 and that this is driven 
by increased feedback signaling from ventrolateral prefrontal to sensory cortices. Although not directly 
implicating a role for any of the structures reviewed above, these data point to possible alternative 
avenues to examine the efficacy of novel anxiolytic treatments.  
When given chronically to healthy individuals, the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) 
citalopram selectively reduces anxiety-potentiated startle (but not fear-potentiated startle) to 
unpredictable threats76. Interestingly, acute citalopram increases anxiety-potentiated startles77, an effect 
consistent with the clinical observations of transiently increased anxiety during initial SSRIs treatments78. 
Both the anxiolytic effects of chronic SSRI administration and the anxiogenic effects of acute SSRI 
administration have been replicated in rodentss79 and the current view is that these effects involve the 
BNST7 and result from interactions between serotonin and corticotropin-releasing factors7,s79.  
Acute tryptophan depletion (ATD) is a dietary manipulation that can be used to temporarily 
reduce levels of serotonin. ATD is associated with increased engagement of the dmPFC-amygala circuit 
that has been shown to be hyper-engaged by both threat of shocks35 and pathological anxietys38 in 
humans. SSRIs may therefore work, at least in part, by elevating synaptic serotonin availability and 
hence reducing engagement of this dorsal prefrontal- amygdala circuits80. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the magnitude of SSRI response is predicted by greater pretreatment reactivity to threats in 
pregenual ACC and lesser reactivity in the amygdalas81. In anxious patients, SSRIs have also been shown 
to attenuate connectivity between the BNST and limbic and paralimbic structuress82. One hypothesis, 
therefore, is that SSRIs work by attenuating putative ‘anxiety network’ hyperactivitys83, but this remains 
to be tested. 
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Another broad class of treatment for anxiety disorders is psychological interventions. The goal 
of the most common psychological intervention, cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), is to attenuate 
negative mood states through cognitive reappraisal and emotion regulation strategiess84. Medial 
prefrontal and amygdala activity have been argued to predict treatment response to CBT in anxietys85, 
perhaps through modulation of circuitry between the medial prefrontal cortex and amygdala. Indeed a 
recent meta-analysis suggested that the most robust predictors in response to therapy were significant 
post-therapy decreases in anterior cingulate/paracingulate gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus and insula 
activitys86.  
One problem with cross-sectional observational studies, however, is that it is unclear if neural 
circuitry change is specifically due to the intervention or rather reflects a generic change in symptoms 
(i.e. it reflects symptom change, not mechanistic change). One way to study this is to explicitly modulate 
basic processes targeted by CBT in the absence of symptom changes. To this end, in healthy individuals, 
simple attentional instruction can alter the engagement of threat of shock induced dorsomedial PFC-
amygdala circuitrys37. Specifically, asking individuals to re-appraise emotional stimuli as neutral dampens 
down activity in the circuitry thought to drive heightened response to threats in anxiety. Ongoing work is 
exploring whether this is a mechanism by which CBT for anxiety works. 
Exposure is another important psychological intervention, with similar efficacy to CBTs87. 
Exposure is primarily targeted at fear responding (e.g., phobias), but can also be used to reduce anxiety. 
A more detailed review on findings from extinction paradigms – extinction is thought to be the 
mechanism by which exposure therapy works - in both humans and animals can be found in Milad and 
Quirk (2012)s88, but studies have implicated some of the same circuitry – activity was reduced in the 
amygdala, insula and anterior cingulate, but increased in the dlPFCs89 following extinction.  
In sum, preliminary work suggests that current treatments for anxiety may be effective through 
modulation of the translational circuitry outlined above. This work is in its infancy, but ultimately, a 
mechanistic understanding of treatment response may eventually enable improvement of existing 
treatments, better targeting of existing treatments to patients who will respond, and provide targets for 
the design of novel treatments: hence resulting in increased recovery rates for anxiety disorders. 
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Future perspectives  
1. One key problem with the current categorical disease classifications for anxiety disorders is that 
of heterogeneity within diagnostic categories and overlapping symptoms across disorders. 
Specifically, anxiety seems to be an obvious candidate for an RDoC-based approach, with the 
RDoC matrix highlighting several constructs (acute threat, potential threat (anxiety), and 
sustained threat) that map onto the distinction made in this paper between anxiety and fear. 
This distinction may map on to different types of vulnerability: perhaps one associated with 
predictable threat (i.e., fear) and the other with unpredictable threat (i.e., anxiety). Of 
relevance, this distinction appears in line with data of factor analytic studies showing a 
distinction for ‘fear disorder’ and ‘anxious-misery’ in the anxiety disorderss90. Large-scale studies 
will be necessary to obtain sufficient power to determine the extent to which anxiety circuitry is 
compromised (in similar, and in different ways) across psychiatric and neurological disorders, 
which could improve classification, treatment planning, and pave the way for precision medicine 
approaches. Anxious patients with heightened sensitivity to unpredictable threat (e.g., panic 
disorders13) for example may particularly benefit from treatment that down-regulate the anxiety 
circuit (e.g., SSRIss76). This approach can be applied more broadly: those with elevated sensitivity 
to unpredictable threat, whatever their psychiatric/neurological diagnosis, may benefit from the 
same treatments.  
2. The BNST has long been overlooked. It is a small but functionally complex structure comprised 
of at least 18 sub-regions36 involved, amongst other functions, in opposing anxiolytic and 
anxiogenic circuits. Basic research in rodents on intrinsic circuits of the BNST and how these 
circuits are impacted by stress hormones and neurotransmitters will be crucial to increase our 
knowledge of normal and pathological anxiety and to develop treatments91. For example, the 
actions of neuropeptide corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) on the BNST in relation to sustained 
anxiety provided a strong rationale for the therapeutic development of CRF1 antagonists to 
treat mood and anxiety disorders. However, these have failed in human modelss92 and in clinical 
trialss93. More studies on the local and more distal connectivity of the BNST will be necessary to 
understand why CRF antagonists are anxiolytic in animal models but not in humans. On this 
note, a question remains about how best to translate our understanding of such subunits into 
humans. Improved, higher resolution, fMRI techniques will undoubtedly help, but fMRI signal is 
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still several steps away from the underlying neural activity. Work with specific PET ligands and 
even direct electrical recording from those with clinical implants may be needed to ultimately 
corroborate translational patterns. 
3. Relatedly, direct translation across humans and animals is difficult. Animal models are essential 
to advance mechanistic understanding of behaviors, but their limitations must be 
acknowledged. Pathological anxiety is, above all, a disorder of feelings supported by conscious 
and unconscious experiences, and animal models rely on overt behaviour and physiological 
measures, rather than cognitions or subjective experiences. Additionally, many processes, e.g. 
the psychological symptoms targeted by CBT, cannot be directly studied in animal models, and 
many regions – especially cortical areas – are likely not direct functional homologues across 
animal models (if they exist at all in animals with smaller cortices). This is of particular concern 
because many animal models of treatment have failed to translate to humans. To overcome 
this, future work may seek to use models of anxiety in healthy humans alongside the exact same 
models in animals as putative anxiolytic drug screens to ensure successful translation. 
Furthermore, cross-fertilization may be important where roadblocks in treatment development 
occur: theories and biological insights from one type of research may produce advances in the 
other.  
4. Beyond pharmacology, neurostimulation research is starting to bear exciting results. Deep brain 
stimulation of the BNST reduces anxiety in a rodent model and in humanss94. Repetitive 
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) is a less invasive neurostimulation technique. As low-
frequency oscillations within cortical networks decrease cortical excitabilitys92, targeting the 
dmPFC or dLPFC-amygdala coupling with low (1Hz) (rTMS) could down-regulate activity in 
this circuit and ultimately reduce negative affect. rTMS of the dlPFC is approved by the FDA as 
a second-line treatment for depression, and research is currently undergoing to examine its 
effectiveness in anxietys95. 
5. Future research should also focus on the emergence of pathological anxiety, ideally taking a 
developmental perspective. There are a number of difficulties inherent in developmental work 
in anxiety, with the most important being the ethical issues with exposing children and 
adolescents to aversive events such as shocks96. However, researchers have recently successfully 
collected data on fear-potentiated startle in adolescents using alternative aversive stimuli such 
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as cold air blasts or aversive screamss96,s97,. These are promising steps towards creating 
paradigms that can elucidate the developmental basis anxiety. 
Concluding remarks 
Our understanding of anxiety circuitry has grown considerably thanks to experimental 
psychopathology models exploring the impact of unpredictable threats. Consistent with animal models, 
fear and anxiety in humans may be mediated by dissociable, although partly overlapping, neural 
mechanisms. Structures implicated in anxiety but not fear include the BNST, hippocampus, dmPFC, 
insula, and dlPFC. Fear- and anxiety-related defensive responses are mediated by the CeA and BNST, 
respectively.  
From a clinical and treatment perspective, there is overlap in the circuitry implicated in 
disorders featuring anxiety and in the mechanism of action of reference anxiolytics. Pathophysiological 
mechanisms are found in the same neural structures that respond adaptively to anxiety induction 
procedures in healthy humans. Neural dysfunction can take two forms, chronic activation (inappropriate 
activation in the absence of anxiety induction challenge, e.g., heightened amygdala-dmPFC connectivity) 
or exaggerated activation in response to an unpredictable threat (i.e., insula).  
Despite this progress, much remains to be learned. With advances in technologies in basic 
(optogenetic, molecular biology, transgenic and knockout mice) and clinical research (high spatial 
resolution of fMRI, better statistical tools), the focus should be on improving knowledge of local 
microcircuits and neural oscillations among distant regions that supports behavior. Clinically, research 
on fear and anxiety circuitry might be used to create an evidence-based nosologys18. Ultimately, 
improved, personalized, and new treatment strategies will be difficult to develop without a better 
understanding of the underlying mechanisms of anxiety; the work reviewed here constitutes a step 
forward, but a precise mechanistic understanding is still far off. 
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Figure 1 caption 
Figure 1: A simplified diagram of fear/anxiety circuitry, derived from animal research. IL = infralimbic cortex; PL = paralimbic 
cortex, vHPC = ventral hippocampus, BLA = basolateral amygdala, CeA = central nucleus of the amygdala, AMG = amygdala. A 
more detailed diagram of part of this circuitry can be found in Calhoon & Tye, 2015. Note that the dlPFC is included on the basis 
of research in non-human primates: rodents may not have a region homologous with the dlPFC.  
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